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A skirmish in the early reception of 
Karl Barth in Scotland: 
The exchange between Thomas F. Torrance 
and Brand Blanshard
Edited by Iain and Morag Torrance
The	name	of	Brand	Blanshard	may	not	be	as	familiar	today	as	it	once	
was.	Blanshard	was	one	of	the	greatest	American	philosophers	of	the	
first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	Born	 in	 Fredericksburg,	Ohio	 in	
August	1892,	Blanshard	was	the	son	of	a	Congregational	minister.	He	
studied	first	at	 the	University	of	Michigan,	and	 then	won	a	Rhodes	







text	was	F.	H.	Bradley’s	The Principles of Logic.	In	1952,	Blanshard	
delivered	the	Gifford	Lectures	at	the	University	of	St	Andrews.	
The	 daily	 newspaper	 The Scotsman	 reported	 on	 the	 Gifford	
Lectures	and	ran	a	short	article	noting	that	Blanshard	had	indulged	in	a	
swipe	against	Karl	Barth.	This	was	too	much	for	Thomas	F.	Torrance,	
at	 that	 point	 still	 Professor	 of	 Church	History	 at	New	College,2	 to	
swallow	without	a	response.	A	theological	argument	followed,	which	
The Scotsman	 was	 kind	 enough	 to	 publish	 in	 full,	 day	 after	 day,	
throughout	April	1952.3	
There	 follow	 the	 initial	 report	 of	Brand	Blanshard’s	 comments,	
and	then	the	exchange	of	letters.	
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Report in The Scotsman, April 11, 1952, p. 6
“THEOLOGY OF CRISIS”
Professor Blanshard resumes Gifford Lectures







The	 new	 theology,	 Professor	 Blanshard	 said,	 owed	 its	







full	 of	 errors,	 and	 that	 in	 the	 long	 struggle	of	 theology	with	











Professor	 Blanshard	 considered	 that	 this	 attempt	 to	 save	









Theology of Karl Barth
New	College,	University	of	Edinburgh,
April	11,	1952
Sir,—I	 have	 read	 with	 astonishment	 the	 account	 in	 your	
columns	 of	 the	 recent	 Gifford	 Lecture	 in	 St	 Andrews,	 in	
which	 Professor	 Brand	 Blanshard	 is	 reported	 as	 describing	
the	theology	of	Karl	Barth	and	Emil	Brunner	as	the	“theology	
of	 crisis”	 and	 criticising	 it	 as	 “this	 attempt	 to	 save	 religious	










seiner	 Theologie,”	 von	 Balthasar	 takes	 careful	 account	 of	
the	 development	 of	 Barth’s	 theology,	 which	 falls	 into	 three	
main	 stages:	 1,	 The	 early	 period	 reaching	 its	 climax	 with	




come	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 Kierkegaard	 and	 his	 theology	







of	 analogy	 in	 which	 Christology	 plays	 the	 dominant	 rôle.	
It	 is	more	 than	 thirty	 years	 ago	 since	 that	 important	 change	
took	place,	and	all	 the	enormous	volumes	of	his	“Kirchliche	
Dogmatik”	 have	 been	 published	 since	 then.	 These	 are	 the	
volumes	 in	which	Barth	has	 taken	issue	 in	 the	most	massive	
way	with	the	theology	of	Rome,	and	from	which	von	Balthasar	
has	admittedly	learned	so	much.	It	is	a	pitiful	tragedy,	however,	
that	 the	 American	 philosopher	 has	 not	 apparently	 peered	
beyond	the	egg-shells	of	the	young	Swiss	thinker!
One	 would	 like	 to	 recommend	 Professor	 Blanshard	 at	
least	 to	 read	Karl	Barth’s	 study	of	Anselm,	“Fides	Quaerens	









is	 unique	 and	 incomparable.	What	 is	 expected	 of	 theology,	
therefore,	is	that	it	should	exhibit	the	kind	of	rationality	which	
corresponds	 with	 this	 unique	 object	 of	 thought.	 This	 is,	 in	
fact,	 the	 rational	 objectivity	 which	 characterises	 faith,	 and	
which	utterly	repudiates	that	salto mortale,	the	sacrifice	of	the	
intellect.
That	 the	Gifford	 lecturer	 should	attribute	 to	Karl	Barth	a	
view	 which	 all	 his	 writings	 for	 thirty	 years	 have	 resolutely	
opposed	is	particularly	surprising	to-day	when	Barth	stands	out	








Letter from Blanshard 
published	in The Scotsman,	April	16,	1952,	p.	6
Theology of Karl Barth
The	University	of	St	Andrews,
April	14,	1952
Sir,—Professor	 Torrance	 has	 expressed	 “astonishment”	 that	




The	best	way,	of	course,	 is	 to	go	 to	 the	writings	of	 these	
men	and	read	their	own	words.	Let	me	cite	a	few	of	them.	First	
a	few	from	various	books	by	Brunner:	“Revealed	knowledge	
is	 poles	 apart	 from	 rational	 knowledge.	These	 two	 forms	 of	
knowledge	are	as	far	apart	as	heaven	is	from	hell.”	“Biblical	







pride,	 this	claim	of	 reason	 to	be	 the	court	of	 last	appeal,	 the	
superior	judge	of	truth,	constitutes	sin;	it	is	the	heart	of	sin.”	
(“Theology	 of	 Crisis,”	 43.)	 Incidentally,	 Professor	 Torrance	
expresses	 surprise	 that	 I	 should	 have	 referred	 to	 this	 school	






Barth	 is,	 if	 anything,	 more	 extreme	 than	 Brunner.	 He	
began	his	Gifford	lectures	by	repudiating	the	very	possibility	
of	 a	 rational	knowledge	of	God	 through	natural	 theology.	 “I	




...	 it	 cannot	 really	be	 the	business	of	 a	Reformed	 theologian	
to	raise	so	much	as	his	little	finger	to	support	this	undertaking	
in	 any	 positive	 way”	 (5–6.)	 Again,	 “It	 is	 forced	 down	 my	
throat	that	the	Dogmatic	theologian	is	under	the	obligation	to	
‘justify’	himself	in	his	utterances	before	philosophy.	To	that	my	






theology,	 while	 he,	 Barth,	 thought	 it	 should	 be	 treated	with	
contempt	and	scorn.	“If	you	really	reject	natural	theology,	you	
don’t	 stand	 and	 stare	 at	 the	 snake	while	 you	 let	 it	 stare	 you	
down	 in	 return,	hypnotise	you,	and	 then	bite	you:	when	you	
see	 it,	 you	 take	 a	 stick	 to	 it	 and	kill	 it.”	 (“Nein! Antwart an 
Brunner,”	13;	my	translation.)
If	 statements	 like	 this	 do	 not	 justify	 calling	 a	 man	 an	







and	 a	 very	 different	meaning	 from	 that	 of	 the	 philosophers.	
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He	thinks	it	enough	if	he	shows	that	faith	for	Barth	“involves	












Letter from Rev. D. W. Greenfield
published	in	The Scotsman,	April	18,	1952,	p.	4










To	 the	 uninstructed,	 however,	 it	 may	 seem	 that	 the	
professors	are	arguing	at	cross	purposes.	Professor	Blanshard	
appears	 to	 accuse	 Barth	 and	 his	 school	 of	 “irrationalism”;	










natural	 and	 revealed	 religion	 is	well	 known.	Barth	 stands	 in	
the	succession	of	all	theologians,	Reformed	and	Roman,	in	his	
assertion	that	salvation	is	of	faith.

























It	 is	 clear	 that	 his	 charge	 of	 anti-rationalism	 against	 the	
theology	of	Karl	Barth	 involves	 a	particular	view	of	 reason,	
but	 he	 cannot	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 a	 view	 generally	 accepted	 by	
philosophers	 to-day,	 by	 Professor	 MacKinnon	 or	 Professor	
Ryle,	 for	 example.	 There	 are,	 however,	 three	 distinct	 if	
inseparable	issues	which	should	be	laid	bare.
1.	A	philosophical	issue	between	an	idealist	view	of	reason,	
and	 a	 realist	 and	 critical	 view.	 Philosophically,	 Karl	 Barth	
stands	within	the	European	tradition	of	critical	philosophy,	of	
which	 his	 brother	Heinrich	Barth,	 Professor	 of	Metaphysics	
in	 the	University	of	Basel,	 is	perhaps	 the	most	distinguished	










Against	 this	 view	 Professor	 Blanshard	 appears	 to	 think	
of	 reason	 as	 behaving	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 own	 nature,	 in	 terms	
of	 the	 categories	 of	 its	 own	understanding.	 It	 is	 against	 that	
autonomous,	 self-sufficient	 reason,	 reason	 turned	 in	 upon	
itself,	that	the	citations	from	Professor	Emil	Brunner	given	by	
Professor	Blanshard	are	directed.	That	is,	they	are	directed	not	















mode	of	 the	activity	of	 reason,	 and	 that	 reason	must	 answer	
appropriately	to	the	object	given.	It	would	be	utterly	unscientific	
and	irrational,	for	example,	to	transpose	into	the	study	of	living	
organisms	 the	 specific	mode	 of	 rational	 activity	 that	 obtains	
in	the	study	of	physics	and	the	particular	categories	that	arise	












properly	 and	 obediently	 to	 the	 object	 given.	 All	 science,	






that	 scientists	 in	 other	 fields	 are	 showing	 such	 increasing	
interest	in	and	understanding	of	his	work,	not	least	those	in	the	
natural	sciences	–	see	the	letter	by	an	American	physicist	from	
the	University	 of	Minnesota	 published	 in	 the	 “Kirchenblatt”	
(Basel),	March	27.
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3.	 A	 religious	 issue.	 The	 great	 difference	 between	
theological	and	natural	science	concerns	the	difference	in	the	
nature	 of	 the	 object.	The	object	 of	 theological	 knowledge	 is	
God	infinite	and	eternal,	“always	Subject.”	As	Barth	puts	it,	not	
“the	absolutely	other”	(a	notion	which	Barth	cast	away	many	





Here	 the	 ruthless	 criticism,	 mentioned	 above,	 is	 spoken	
of	as	self-denial	and	taking	up	of	the	Cross,	and	that	ruthless	









If	 that	 is	 the	 real	 reason	 why	 Professor	 Blanshard	 calls	
Karl	Barth’s	 view	of	 reason	 anti-rationalism,	 then	 it	 is	 clear	
that	the	real	issue	does	not	lie	between	Blanshard	and	Barth,	
but	 between	 Blanshard	 and	 the	 Christian	 Gospel.	 But	 even	
apart	from	this	offence	at	 the	Cross	which	makes	foolish	the	
wisdom	of	 this	world,	 as	St	 Paul	 puts	 it,	 surely	 it	would	 be	
a	highly	unscientific	and	 irrational	way	for	 reason	 to	behave	
if	when	directed	to	know	the	living	God	it	refused	to	answer	















have	 over	 and	 over	 again,	 and	 in	 the	 most	 explicit	 terms,	
denied	 that	 the	 standards	 of	 natural	 reason,	 the	 reason	 used	
by	 scientists	 and	 philosophers,	 are	 valid	 for	 the	 knowledge	
of	 God.	 Professor	 Torrance	 agrees	 that	 they	 deny	 this,	 but	






Now	 with	 all	 respect	 to	 an	 able	 theologian,	 I	 think	 this	
is	 juggling	 with	 words.	 That	 Brunner	 and	 Barth	 do	 believe	
in	 such	 conformity	 I	 agree.	But	whether	 it	 should	 be	 called	
rational	or	not	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	object	conformed	
to.	 If	 that	 object	 requires	 that,	 to	 conform	 to	 it,	 we	 must	
accept	both	 sides	of	 a	 contradiction,	 to	 call	 such	conformity	
“rational	 knowledge”	 seems	 to	me	 perverse.	And	 yet	 that	 is	
precisely	 what	 conformity	 does	 require	 by	 those	 authors’	














make	 our	 response	 to	 it	 rational,	we	 should	 have	 to	 rewrite	
the	 theory	 of	 knowledge.	 We	 should	 have	 to	 include	 as	
rational	 knowledge	 the	 ineffable	 rapport	 of	 the	 mystic,	 the	
Buddhists’s	absorption	in	Nirvana,	the	musician’s	response	to	
an	 aria,	 and,	 I	 suppose,	 the	 child’s	 response	 to	 a	 command.	
Even	 Schopenhauer’s	 irrationalism,	 since	 it	 provided	 for	 an	







its	way	 largely	because	of	 its	boldness	 in	 repudiating	 reason	


















natured	 replies	 to	my	criticisms	 that	 the	 issue	between	us	 is	
not	 a	 simple	 one,	 as	 he	 maintains,	 but	 involves	 the	 whole	
philosophical	 debate	 of	 modern	 times,	 particularly	 since	
Wilhelm	 Dilthey,	 about	 the	 relation	 between	 knowing	 and	
being,	thinking	and	acting,	logic	and	history.







like	Barth	and	Brunner)	on	 the	ground	 that	 it	 fails	utterly	 to	
meet	critical	metaphysics	and	science	on	their	own	grounds.
The	very	 fact	 that	my	 criticisms	 appear	 to	 him	only	 like	





columns	 of	 a	 daily	 newspaper	 of	 the	 dignity	 and	 culture	 of	
The Scotsman,	but	there	are	several	points	that	require	further	
clarification.
Long	 ago,	 in	 Edinburgh	 University,	 David	 Hume,	 in	
his	 “Dialogues	 Concerning	 Natural	 Religion,”	 taught	 us	
to	 observe	 the	 distinction	 between	 ectypal	 and	 archetypal	
analogy	when	he	protested	against	projecting	into	theology	the	
ectypal	 analogies	drawn	 from	 the	world	of	nature	 as	 though	
T
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they	were	 archetypal.	That	 is	 precisely	 the	 protest	 that	Karl	
Barth	 has	 raised	 in	 the	 whole	 field	 of	 natural	 theology.	 For	
him	the	objective	revelation	of	God	in	the	historical	Christ	is	








Further,	 what	 does	 Professor	 Blanshard	 mean	 by	 “mere	
conformity	to	an	object”?	In	his	discussion	of	Anselm’s	“faith	
seeking	to	understand	the	Truth,”	Karl	Barth	points	out	that	the	
rationality	of	 faith	 involves	a	 three-fold	 ratio,	 in	 the	 rational	
experience	 of	 faith,	 in	 the	 rational	 conformity	 of	 faith	 to	 its	
object,	and	in	the	ratio	of	the	Truth	itself	which	is	fundamental.	
That	 is	 the	view	which	Barth	 took	over	 from	Anselm	and	 it	
needs	no	commentary	to	bring	out	the	radical	misinterpretation	











That	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 “they	 accepted	 both	 sides	 of	 a	
contradiction,”	 as	 Professor	 Blanshard	 mistakenly	 assumes,	
but	that	they	recognised	the	importance	and	depth	of	paradox	
in	 the	 human	 expression	 of	 the	 truth	 and	 that	 they	 were	
prepared	 to	 say	 “yes”	 and	 “no”	 at	 crucial	 points	 of	 an	 issue	




“dialectical,”	 and	 it	 is	many	years	 now	 since	 that	 stage	was	
left	behind.	Brunner	moved	back	 in	a	 scholastic	direction	 in	











Throughout	 all	 this	 rational	 theological	 activity	 Barth	 is	













Sir,—In	 several	 long	 letters	 published	 in	 your	 columns,	
Professor	 Torrance	 has	 taken	 me	 to	 task	 for	 calling	 the	
theologians	 Brunner	 and	 Barth	 irrationalists.	 I	 offered	 in	
reply	 a	 series	 of	 passages	 from	 their	 own	writings	 in	which	
T
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it	was	maintained:	 (1)	 that	our	natural	 reason	does	and	must	
break	down	when	 it	 seeks	a	knowledge	of	God,	and	(2)	 that	
God	 is	 so	 different	 from	 the	world	 that	His	 nature	 is	 bound	
to	present	itself	to	our	reason	as	“foolishness”	and	even	self-
contradiction.	To	my	mind	these	statements	were	conclusive.	
For	what	 could	 irrationalism	mean	 if	 not	 that	 the	 real	 is,	 to	
our	 reason,	 unintelligible	 and	 incoherent?	And	yet	Professor	
Torrance	holds	 that	“Barth	stands	out	 in	Europe	as	 the	great	
protagonist	against	irrationalism.”
What	is	his	ground	for	this	view?	This:	that	if	we	redefine	
reason	 to	 mean	 conformity	 with	 an	 object,	 we	 can	 make	
Barth	out	to	be	a	kind	of	rationalist,	even	if	such	conformity	
means	the	abandonment	of	 the	laws	and	standards	of	natural	




Professor	Torrance	 tries	 to	 convey	 the	 idea	of	what	 such	
knowledge	might	be	by	references	to	“archetypal	and	ectypal	








all	 objectivity	 ...	 or,	 rationalism;”	 it	 is	 “something	which	 is	
distinguished	not	gradually	or	quantitatively,	but	qualitatively,	
from	anything	which	man	can	know	...”	(“The	Word	and	the	
World.”	 45,	 75,	 17.)	 Could	 there	 be	 a	 flatter	 denial	 of	 the	
interpretation	Professor	Torrance	 is	offering	 for	 the	 theology	
of	crisis?
When	I	suggest	 that	 the	 issue	 is	simple	and	clean-cut,	he	
replies	 that	 it	 “involves	 the	 whole	 philosophical	 debate	 of	




















This	 is	 significant.	 It	 suggests	 where	 Barth	 and	 Brunner	
really	stand.	Their	theology,	like	that	of	Newman	and	Pascal,	
is	built	on	despair	of	human	reason.	They	hope	by	renouncing	








		 My	 father	 did	 not	 transfer	 to	 the	Chair	 of	 Christian	Dogmatics	
until	1	October	1952.
3
		 In	 a	 letter	 dated	 10	December	 1991,	The Scotsman	 granted	me	
permission	to	re-print	the	letters	in	the	context	of	an	article.	My	
father’s	death	on	2	December	2007	prompted	me	finally	to	do	this,	
and	I	am	grateful	to	my	wife	Morag	(who	always	got	on	excellently	
with	my	father,	one	direct	person	to	another)	who	did	most	of	the	
work.
